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Before 1948, the Cold War was largely confined to Europe and the Middle East, areas that both U.S. and
Soviet leaders considered vital to their nations’ core foreign policy objectives after the Second World War.
 By 1950, however, the Cold War had spread to Asia.  First, Mao Zedong’s communist armies prevailed in
the long-running Chinese civil war in October 1949, making the world’s most populous country part of the
communist bloc.  Then, on July 25, 1950, communist North Korea invaded Western-oriented South Korea,
igniting a bloody war and intensifying the mood of global crisis.  U.S. officials assumed that Stalin and
Mao were behind the North Korean attack and feared that the assault marked the start of a broader
offensive in other parts of the continent.  Even as they sent troops to defend South Korea, U.S. leaders
pumped money and weapons into the region to help bolster friendly forces.  Underlying such behavior
was a strong sense, illustrated in the following analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency, that losing the
region to the communist bloc would have an array of devastating strategic, economic, military, and
psychological repercussions extending far beyond Southeast Asia.
Communist domination of mainland Southeast Asia would not be critical to US security
interests but would have serious immediate and direct consequences.  The gravest of such
consequences would be a spreading of doubt and fear among other threatened non-
Communist countries as to the ability of the US to back up its proclaimed intention to halt
Communist expansion everywhere.  Unless offset by positive additions to the security of non-
Communist countries in other sensitive areas of the world, the psychological effect of the loss
of mainland Southeast Asia would not only strengthen Communist propaganda that the
advance of Communism is inexorable but would encourage countries vulnerable to Soviet
pressure to adopt “neutral” attitudes in the cold war, or possibly even lead them to an
accommodation with Communism.
Domination of the Southeast Asian mainland would increase the threat to such Western
outposts in the Pacific as the island chain extending from Japan to Australia and New Zealand.
 The extension of Communist control, via Burma, to the borders of India and Pakistan would
augment the slowly developing Communist threat to the Indian subcontinent.  The fall of the
Southeast Asian mainland would increase the feeling of insecurity already present in Japan as
a result of Communist successes in China and would further underline the apparent economic
advantages to the Japanese of association with a communist-dominated Asian sphere.
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The countries of mainland Southeast Asia produce such materials on the US strategic list as
rubber, tin, shellac, kapok, and teak in substantial volume. Although access to these countries
is not considered to be “absolutely essential in an emergency” by the National Security
Resources Board, US access to this area is considered “desirable.”  Unlimited Soviet access
to the strategic materials of Southeast Asia would probably be “desirable” for the USSR but
would not be “absolutely essential in an emergency” and therefore denial of the resources of
the area to the Soviet Union would not be essential to the US strategic position. Communist
control over the rice surpluses of the Southeast Asian mainland would, however, provide the
USSR with considerable bargaining power in its relations with other countries of the Far East.
Loss of the area would indirectly affect US security interests through its important economic
consequences for countries aligned with the US. Loss of Malaya would deprive the UK of its
greatest net dollar earner. An immediate consequence of the loss of Indochina might be a
strengthening of the defense of Western Europe since French expenditures for men and
materiel in Indochina would be available to fulfill other commitments. Exclusion of Japan from
trade with Southeast Asia would seriously frustrate Japanese prospects for economic
recovery.
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Communist domination of mainland Southeast Asia would place unfriendly forces astride the
most direct and best-developed sea and air routes between the Western Pacific and India and
the Near East.  The denial to the US of intermediate routes in mainland Southeast Asia would
be significant because communications between the US and India and the Near East would be
essential in a global war.  In the event of such a war, the development of Soviet submarine
and air bases in mainland Southeast Asia probably would compel the detour of US and allied
shipping and air transportation in the Southeast Asia region via considerably longer alternate
routes to the south.  This extension of friendly lines of communication would hamper US
strategic movements in this region and tend to isolate the major non-Communist bases In the
Far East – the offshore island chain and Australia – from existing bases in East Africa and the
Near and Middle East, as well as from potential bases on the Indian sub-continent.
Besides disrupting established lines of communication in the area, the denial of actual military
facilities in mainland Southeast Asia – in particular, the loss of the major naval operating bases
at Singapore – would compel the utilization of less desirable peripheral bases. Soviet
exploitation of the naval and air bases in mainland Southeast Asia probably would be limited
by the difficulties of logistic support but would, nevertheless, increase the threat to existing
lines of communication.
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The loss of any portion of mainland Southeast Asia would increase possibilities for the
extension of Communist control over the remainder.  The fall of Indochina would provide the
Communists with a staging area in addition to China for military operations against the rest of
mainland Southeast Asia, and this threat might well inspire accommodation in both Thailand
and Burma.  Assuming Thailand’s loss, the already considerable difficulty faced by the British
in maintaining security in Malaya would be greatly aggravated.  Assuming Burma’s internal
collapse, unfavorable trends in India would be accelerated.  If Burma were overcome by
external aggression, however, a stiffening of the attitude of the Government of India toward
International Communism could be anticipated.
Source:  http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000258837/DOC_0000258837.pdf
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Mao Zedong proclaiming the founding of the People’s Republic of China in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, October 1, 1949 (Image courtesy of the People’s Republic of
China)
South Korean refugees flee south to escape the North Korean army, 1950 (Image courtesy of the United States Government)
U.S. air and ground Marines fighting Chinese forces in Korea, 1950 (Image courtesy of the United States Federal Government)
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